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Direct Concern in Regional Policy:
The European Court of Justice and
the Southern Question
Daniela Caruso

Abstract: For a few years, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has declared inadmissible, for lack of direct concern, a number of annulment actions initiated by sub-state
actors in the context of regional policy. This article compares the ECJ’s holdings with the
General Court’s more generous application of the ‘direct concern’ standard in some of the
same disputes, and argues in favour of the General Court’s approach. The cases hereby
analysed pertain to the implementation of structural funds in Southern Italy. Relating
regional policy to the historical unfolding of the ‘Southern Question’, this article examines
the unexpected opportunity for civic and administrative renewal brought by regional
policy to Italy’s South in the late 1990s, and links standing for sub-state actors to the
long-term realisation of that opportunity. It further argues that a more direct judicial
involvement with territorial policies would prompt taxonomic renewal in EU law as a
discipline.

I

Introduction

The issue of standing to challenge European Community (EC) acts received great
interest in European law circles in two different circumstances. First, in the 1980s,
judicial standing became the catalyst for debates on European democracy. It was
through the lens of standing in actions for annulment that the European Parliament
fought and eventually won its battle for political recognition.1 Second, in the past
decade, the fundamental theme of effective judicial protection in the legal order of the
EU was debated at length in terms of judicial standing. The famous pleas of Spanish
farmers and French fishermen, whose right to challenge various EC regulations had
been denied in court, brought to everyone’s attention the lofty goal of guaranteeing
an effective remedy to all those affected by Community action.2 That debate resulted
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Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339; Case 302/87, Parliament v Council
(Comitology Decision) [1988] ECR 5615; Case C-70/88, Parliament v Council (Chernobyl I) [1990] ECR
I-2041.
Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677; Case C-263/02 P, Comm’n
v Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA [2004] ECR I-3425.
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in a new formulation of Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
(TFEU).3
Today, other salient issues are emerging from the doctrinal intricacies of judicial
standing. The Treaty of Lisbon, in the context of a general expansion of the institutional role of sub-state entities, granted judicial access to the Committee of Regions as
a whole,4 but left unanswered the plea of regions for privileged standing.5 Against this
background, this article focuses on a particular string of actions for annulment of
Community decisions, initiated by sub-national actors in the context of structural
funds.6 The excruciating technicality of the problems involved should not bury their
substantive importance. At stake in these disputes are the architecture of participatory
democracy and the legal (as opposed to political) status of cohesion in contemporary
Europe.
Essentially, the cases analysed in these pages share the following pattern: regions or
local government agencies receive EU structural funds for specific projects; implementation and spending prove problematic; the Commission decides to revoke funding;
and the recipients demand that the Commission’s decision be annulled, only to find
their pleas rejected in court. Several of these cases concern development policies in
Southern Italy, also known as Mezzogiorno—an area notoriously characterised by
thorny social and political issues.7
The message that the Union sends this area at the end of such disputes is, for right
or wrong, one of disinterest. The Commission seems eager to engage the periphery of
sub-national actors when things go well, so as to bypass the state and to promote
supranational integration,8 but it is equally eager to disengage when things go badly.
The General Court occasionally opens the door to judicial dialogue between Brussels
and the southern periphery, but the ECJ regularly shuts it down, thereby affirming the
Commission’s posture.
One aspect of this story has already been identified in the literature under the heading
of ‘regional blindness.’9 The difficulty for regions in establishing standing in annulment
actions is just one of the many hurdles they encounter in asserting their political
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Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on EU and the Treaty establishing the EC, December 13, 2007,
2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union Art 263, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 (hereinafter TFEU).
TFEU Art 263 and Treaty of Lisbon Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity
and Proportionality Art 8.
See K. Lenaerts, ‘Access of regions with legislative powers to the European Court of Justice’, in
Committee of the Regions (ed), Implementation of the Subsidiarity Principle (Brussels, 2008), at 13. The
recent Case C-444/08 P (Região autónoma dos Açores v Council [2009] ECR I-200) further highlights the
relevance of regional standing in the context of environmental debates.
The issue of standing for non-privileged actors in matters of structural funds regards, of course, not just
regions. See, eg Case C-321/95, Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and Others v
Comm’n, [1998] ECR I-1651.
The expression ‘Southern Question’ (Questione Meridionale) refers to the socio-economic problems
experienced by the south of Italy since its political unification in 1861. It also refers to the profound
economic dualism of the country, which is characterised by a lively and competitive economy in its
northern regions. N. Moe, The View from Vesuvius (University of California, 2009), at 1.
Evidence of this cooperative attitude is given in Case T-272/02, Comune di Napoli v Comm’n [2005] ECR
II-1849 (where the Commission expresses hope for a non-judicial solution of the controversy and counts
on further meetings).
S. Weatherhill, ‘The Challenge of the Regional Dimension in the European Union’, in S. Weatherill and
U. Bernitz (eds), The Role of Regions and Sub-National Actors in Europe (Oxford: Hart, 2005), at 1.
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existence in the EU,10 and there is no lack of insightful commentary on the need to let
local governments participate in European decision making.11 Particularly relevant is
the literature linking locus standi with the full and fair participation of sub-state players
in a range of new governance processes.12 There is also important scholarship on the
administrative practices generated by structural funds, on the possibility for deliberative democracy in the shared management of grants, and on the opportunities for
grass-root participation triggered at every step of project selection and implementation.13 The bulk of structural-funds action happens indeed far away from Luxembourg,
and the scholarly focus has accordingly given little weight to the sparse case law in such
matters.14
This essay focuses, by contrast, precisely on the fact that the EU courts have recently
engaged more directly with cohesion policy,15 and have done so in a particular sociopolitical context. This fact is remarkable for several reasons. First, Southern Italy is an
area where cohesion policy, due to a series of historical contingencies, came to acquire
extraordinary salience in the late 1990s. That experience, in turn, brought new life to
European regional policy in the form of an independent report requested by the
Commission, which is informing contemporary cohesion strategies.16 An analysis of
that context demonstrates the potential impact of structural funds on the legal and
political life of backwards regions—if not directly on their material progress.
At a second and more systemic level, the judicial engagement of EU courts with
territorial policy is bound to affect the relative weight of such policies in legal discourse.
It is well known that the entire body of EU law centres upon judicial pronouncements,
that the role of the ECJ in shaping the substance of legal integration has gone way
beyond the limits of the founding fathers’ imagination, and that the methods used in
Luxembourg have subverted the Napoleonic idea of judicial subservience to legal text.17
Over the years, the ECJ has become a key player in the elaboration of rules for the
Community.18 What the ECJ does not deal with is not really ‘law’ in the perception of
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Regions ‘have no better standing under Art 230 than a private individual.’ Weatherhill, supra n 9, at 5.
See G. De Búrca, ‘Developing Democracy Beyond the State’, (2008) 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational
Law 221, 249 (articulating the theoretical implications of this participation and positing that the ‘selfinterest of bodies and organisations wishing to maximise their reputation and their authority’ is conducive
to democracy in decision-making processes based outside the nation-State).
J. Scott and S. Sturm, ‘Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance’, (2007)
13 Columbia Journal of European Law 565, 576.
See, eg R. Balme and D. Chabanet, European Governance and Democracy: Power and Protest in the EU
(Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), esp. at 145–151.
Commentary of the cases discussed in these pages is provided by A. Turk, Judicial Review in EU Law
(Edward Elgar, 2009), at 59–63 and by C. Alvaro, ‘La Politica Regionale nella Giurisprudenza Comunitaria’, (2009) 23 Rivista Giuridica del Mezzogiorno 403, 407–412.
The terms ‘cohesion policy’ and ‘regional policy’ are used synonymously in these pages as in most of the
literature on such subjects.
F. Barca, An Agenda for a Reformed Cohesion Policy. A Place-Based Approach to Meeting European
Union Challenges and Expectations (April 2009) (hereinafter ‘Barca Report’), available at http://ec.
europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/future/pdf/report_barca_v0306.pdf (last accessed 20 September 2011).
One important aspect of the current debate is whether to focus more on regional convergence or on
territorial competitiveness and innovation. See Balme and Chabanet, supra n 13, at 150.
M. Lasser, Judicial Transformations. The Rights Revolution in the Courts of Europe (Oxford University
Press, 2010), esp. at 64 (discussing the impact of EU law on the relation between legislative and judicial
power in French law).
E. Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’, (1981) 75 The American
Journal of International Law 1.
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legal practitioners and scholars. And because the business of the court still revolves
around the realisation of the four freedoms and its two corollaries—competition and
protection of fundamental rights—textbooks, academic writings and symposia continue to centre upon such issues. For being a policy that employs over one third of the
EU budget, cohesion is still strikingly minor in judicial discourse. The recent escalation
of encounters between the ECJ and the periphery in matters of structural funds may
change this state of affairs. The new cases may bring the implementation of cohesion
policy closer to what counts as law proper in the legal community.
A third reason for investigating these cases is that the judicial engagement with
cohesion blurs the taxonomic lines separating, within the EU legal order, old from new
governance, central from local law-making, and ultimately law from redistribution.
Cohesion policies involve focusing on welfare, which is a matter of political choice and,
most importantly in EU legal discourse, a traditional prerogative of State sovereignty.
Cohesion policy is therefore too often treated as peripheral to supranational matters.
The cases analysed in these pages may reverse this entrenched and marginalising
characterisation.

II

The Doctrine

The doctrinal question in these cases is whether the sub-state applicant, while not being
the formal addressee of the Commission’s decision to cancel financial assistance, can
still have standing to request that the decision be annulled. To establish standing, the
applicant must show direct concern. Individual concern—the other prong of the standing test—is routinely found to be present because the applicant is either the named
beneficiary of the funds or at least the entity in charge of the realisation of the funded
project.19 Direct concern, by contrast, is difficult to establish for two reasons: first,
funds are given primarily to the State, and in the legislative framework of structural
funds, the State remains the pivotal interlocutor to the Commission;20 second, even
after EU funds have been revoked, it is still theoretically possible for the State to
continue to fund the project until completion out of its own pocket, and to neutralise
the adverse impact of the Commission’s decision on the finances of local entities.
In the past few years, two Advocates General have invoked both reasons to deny the
admissibility of a sub-state actor’s challenge.21 The Court of Justice has followed their
opinions consistently. The General Court, however, has been less aligned. At times, it
has simply ignored the issue of standing, letting the applicant win or—more often—lose
on the merits.22 At other times, the General Court has tackled the issue frontally and
19

20
21

22

Opinion of Advocate General (Op. Advoc. Gen.) Ruiz-Arabo Colomer, Case C-417/04 P, Regione
Siciliana v Comm’n [2006] ECR I-03881, at 71.
ibid.
ibid and Op. Advoc. Gen. Kokott, Joined Cases C-445 & C-455/07 P, Comm’n v Ente per le Ville Vesuviane
[2009] ECR I-7993.
In Case T-272/02, Comune di Napoli v Comm’n [2005] ECR II-1849, the General Court does not even rule
on the admissibility of Napoli’s application and moves quickly to the merits. (Napoli’s application failed
on the merits.) This cavalier attitude bothers AG Ruiz-Arabo Colomer, who clearly thinks the issue is
important. Op. Advoc. Gen., Case C-417/04 P, at 3. In Case T-176/06, Sviluppo Italia Basilicata SpA v
Comm’n [2008] ECR II-126, the General Court dismissed as unfounded on the merits the application of
Sviluppo Italia Basilicata for annulment of Commission Decision C(2006) 1706 reducing financial assistance from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The General Court did not address at all
the question of admissibility, and the ECJ upon review decided to ignore the part of the Commission’s
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concluded that, in particular circumstances, direct concern can be established.23 The
Commission has not been pleased with such conclusions, even when granted victory on
the merits.24 It has therefore fought for affirming the idea that, when funds are revoked,
sub-national actors may bring their complaints to their State’s capital if they so please,
but must not bother Luxembourg.25
The Commission, besides a number of textual arguments, has excellent policy
reasons on its side. First, if funds have already been paid out, the practical problem for
the Commission is recovering them. From the creditor’s standpoint, the state certainly
appears to be a better debtor than its constituent localities: it has deeper pockets, and
also many ongoing dealings with Brussels, so that the Commission may get its money
back simply by withholding sums it owes the state for other reasons. Second, the
Commission expects the Member States to remain, as per legislative design, the only
guardians against the mischief of sub-state actors, and wants no policing role at the
receiving end of its cohesion policy.26 The management of structural funds is so deeply
enmeshed with local politics, and so often plagued by inefficiency and corruption, that
direct involvement with the periphery in the course of judicial disputes might be
pointless if not altogether counter-productive.
As a result, the Commission treats structural fund grants as if they were special
creatures of private law: contracts with a third-party beneficiary, whose rights remain
dependent upon the action of the contracting parties and never achieve the status of
directly claimable entitlements. Before the ECJ, the Commission has so far prevailed.27
By contrast, the attitude of the General Court has often been defiant, and is worth
exploring insofar as it amplifies the otherwise inaudible voice of the disgruntled applicants. The following section begins with one such episode of defiance, dated 2005, and
goes on to explore its recent reiterations.

III

The Cases

On October 18, 2005, the General Court rendered a judgment that would prove
irritating in the eyes of the Commission and of many others.28 Visually, the background
of Case T-60/03 can be pictured as a large and idle dam built across the Sicilian River

23

24

25
26

27

28

defence based on the appellant’s lack of direct concern and therefore of standing. Case C-414/08 P,
Sviluppo Italia Basilicata SpA v Comm’n [2010] ECR I-2559, at 51–52. See also Case T-65/04, Nuova Gela
Sviluppo v Comm’n [2007] ECR II-68, at 27–29 (where the Court of First Instance asserts its prerogative
to bypass the question of admissibility and to simply reject the application on its merits).
Case T-189/02, Ente per le Ville Vesuviane v Comm’n [2007] ECR II-89 (action dismissed on merits but
found expressly admissible).
Joined Cases C-445 & 455/07 P, Ville Vesuviane [2009] ECR I-7993 (on cross appeal from Case T-189/02,
Ville Vesuviane [2007] ECR II-89).
ibid.
See, eg the text invoked by the General Court to deny standing to a Portuguese sub-state entity in a
dispute concerning the revocation of cohesion funds (Case T-324/06 R, Municìpio de Gondomar v Comm’n
[2008] ECR II-173): Commission Reg 1164/94, Art 5.2, 1994 O.J. (L 130) 1 and Commission Reg 1831/94,
Art 7, 1994 O.J. (L 191) 9 (both envisaging direct relations between the Commission and the state only).
Most notably in Case T-189/02, Ville Vesuviane [2007] ECR II-89 (reversed on point of admissibility by
Joined Cases C-445 & 455/07 P, Ville Vesuviane [2009] ECR I-7993) and in Case T-60/03, Regione
Siciliana v Comm’n [2005] ECR II-4139 (reversed on point of admissibility by Case C-15/06 P, Regione
Siciliana v Comm’n [2007] ECR I-2591).
Turk, supra note 14, at 59–63, noticing the difference between this case and several others decided by the
same court on the subject of direct concern.
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Gibbesi. Its construction started in the 1980s and is now completed, but the proper
infrastructure of channels that would allow for the agricultural fruition of the river’s
water is still lacking. As a result, the precious water that accumulates from time to time
goes wasted, and many fields stay tragically dry.29 In December 1987, the Region of
Sicily had successfully obtained structural funds for the completion of the project.
According to the Commission, the dam was meant to be subservient to a new industrial
complex to be built in province of Licata. The local land owners hoped that the dam
would (also) bring water to their fields, but in the eyes of the Commission, the core
function of the dam was to be industrial rather than agricultural.30 Several years after
the funding was awarded, it became clear to the Commission that the Licata complex
would not see the light, and funds were accordingly revoked. When the Region
appealed, the General Court had no trouble confirming the correctness of the Commission’s decision on the merits. But it did so only after finding that Sicily’s action for
annulment was procedurally admissible.
The decision was, on this point, at odds with the General Court’s own ruling
concerning similar Sicilian matters.31 Only 1 year earlier, the same court had told Sicily
that it had no direct concern, and therefore no standing to challenge the Commission’s
decision to cancel structural funds. That case concerned a modern highway connecting
Palermo, the region’s capital, with Messina—the island’s closest city to Italy’s main
land. Sicily had then pleaded its very direct relationship with the Commission,
exhibiting—in the mode of a spurned lover—proof of written correspondence.32 But the
Court had not been moved: the region’s concern was not direct enough because the
Italian Republic, interlocutor of the Commission by legislative design, could have still
decided not to recover the funds from Sicily, and to pay the ensuing EU debt out of its
own pocket.
Given this recent precedent, why would the General Court change its posture so
abruptly in the Gibbesi affair? The very timing of its decision in T-60/03 also had a
defiant flair. The issue of Sicily’s locus standi after cancellation of financial assistance
would be soon discussed by the ECJ in the review of the highway case,33 so it might have
been proper for the General Court to stay put, waiting for guidelines from above.34
Moreover, Sicily had filed a whole new series of similar cases, all pending, and the
General Court’s welcoming gesture might be seen as an unconscionable abdication of
its gate-keeping role.35 A sharp rectification was in order.

29
30

31

32

33
34

35

See, eg ‘Comune di Delia—Crisi Idrica—Diga Gibbesi’, in Canicattì Notizie, April 28, 2010.
The improvement of irrigation of over 1000 hectares was a ‘secondary objective.’ Structural Funds:
Commission decides to cancel the financing for an investment in the region of Sicily, Italy, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/newsroom/document/sicily_en.pdf (last accessed 20 September 2011).
Most importantly, Case T-341/02, Regione Siciliana v Comm’n [2004] ECR II-2877 (appealed in Case
C-417/04 P, Regione Siciliana v Comm’n [2006] ECR I-3881). See also, less directly on point, Case
T-190/00, Regione Siciliana v Comm’n [2003] ECR II-5015 (state aid for Sicilian agriculture held void.
Region’s application for annulment dismissed).
‘[T]he applicant points out that, contrary to what the Commission maintains, direct legal relations existed
between itself and the Commission with respect to the project at issue.’ T-341/02, Siciliana [2004] ECR
II-2877, at 46. (citing letter of 1997 from the Commission to Sicily).
C-417/04P had been filed on September 29, 2004.
AG Ruiz-Arabo Colomer finds it ‘surprising’ that the General Court went ahead and decided the case
without waiting for the ECJ to decide C-417/04 P, which also has to do with cancellation of assistance
from the ERDF. Op. Advoc. Gen., Case C-417/04 P, Regione Siciliana [2006] ECR I-3881, at 3.
ibid, at 3 n. 6.
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Both Sicily (on the merits) and the Commission (on admissibility) promptly
appealed Case T-60/03, thereby setting the stage for judicial reversal before the ECJ
in due course. The highway case, however, provided a more immediate opportunity
to chastise the erring Tribunal. AG Ruiz-Arabo Colomer was to give his opinion in
that case,36 so he seized the chance to reprimand the General Court’s inconsistency.
The AG made sure to criticise not just the court’s explicit grant of standing to certain
sub-state entities, but also its alternative technique of jumping to the merits of structural funds disputes without saying anything at all about admissibility.37 Admissibility is important, his message went, and it is important that standing be explicitly
denied when the applicant is a sub-national recipient of structural funds.38 This
opinion was rendered on January 12th, 2006, and the ECJ fully embraced its findings
on May 2nd of the same year.
The Court of First Instance was convinced up to a point. Rather than promptly
dismissing as flatly inadmissible the many similar cases pending on its docket, it decided
to stay all such proceedings a little longer, until after the ECJ’s forthcoming pronouncement on the Gibbesi matter.39 When the Gibbesi controversy finally reached the ECJ,
the court ruled against admissibility along the clear argumentative lines already drawn
by AG Ruiz-Arabo Colomer.40 The issue seemed solved, éclairé for good.
And yet it was not. Since then, the General Court has had other opportunities to deal
with disappointed beneficiaries of EU assistance in Southern Italy, and its attitude has
been mixed.41 In some cases it has, deliberately and confidently, adjudicated merits
without first dealing with admissibility hurdles;42 and in other cases, it has explicitly
found that sub-state entities have standing.43 Being a court of law, it has cast such acts
of disobedience in respectful form, carefully distinguishing the facts before it from the
ECJ’s recent and relevant precedents. In the eyes of the General Court, not all sub-state
applicants are equal, and not all must undergo the pattern of rejection suffered by Sicily
in both the highway and the Gibbesi situations.
In the case of Ville Vesuviane, for instance (yet another Southern Italian scenario),
the recipient of funds had been explicitly designated both responsible party for the
execution of the project and beneficiary of the funds. Moreover, Italy had expressly
decided not to grant out of its coffers the amount revoked by the Commission so that
the sub-state actor would unquestionably bear the brunt of the cancellation. Direct
concern—the General Court held—is established in such cases. For this holding, the

36
37
38
39

40
41

42
43

Op. Advoc. Gen., Case C-417/04 P, Regione Siciliana [2006] ECR I-3881.
ibid, at 3, referring to Case T-272/02, Napoli [2005] ECR II-1849.
ibid.
On September 25, 2008, the General Court finally decided a number of offset cases (Joined Cases T-392
& 408 & 414 & 435/03, Regione Siciliana v Comm’n [2008] ECR II-2489). On the same day, but separately,
the General Court issues an ordinance dismissing another plea of the region concerning revocation of
ERDF grants for Porto Empedocle (Case T-363/03, Regione Siciliana v Comm’n [2008] ECR II-201).
Case C-15/06 P, Siciliana [2007] ECR I-2591.
Occasionally, the General Court has flatly aligned itself with the ECJ’s denial of standing for sub-state
actors. In an order of June 11, 2007, addressed to the Portuguese local entity of Gondomar, the judge
refers simply to the precedents concerning Regione Siciliana (C-15/06 P and 417/04 P) and finds the
application manifestly inadmissible. Case T-324/06 R, Gondomar [2008] ECR II-173. The order was
appealed, to no avail, in Case C-501/08 P, Municìpio de Gondomar v Comm’n [2009] ECR I-152.
See especially Case T-65/04, Nuova Gela [2007] ECR II-68, at 27–29.
Case T-189/02, Ville Vesuviane [2007] ECR II-89. With order of November 25, 2005 (referred to in ibid at
20) the General Court had purposely deferred deciding this case until after the ECJ’s holding in 417/04P.
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court received another reprimand, again in the judicially proper form of a reversal
before the ECJ complete with an opinion by AG Kokott.44
Reversal was avoided in another, more recent case, concerning the challenge of a
sub-state recipient from the Region of Basilicata.45 The General Court’s choice to
address directly the merits of the case, instead of adjudicating the preliminary point of
admissibility, was justified by reasons of ‘procedural economy.’46 The applicant lost on
the merits and appealed. By the time the victorious Commission raised the issue of
inadmissibility before the ECJ, the issue seemed beside the point and could be set
conceptually aside.47 Jumping to the merits without bothering with admissibility concerns is a practice that AG Ruiz-Arabo Colomer had frowned upon, but the General
Court was clearly undeterred. As it held in a related dispute,
One must remember that the Community judge, depending on the circumstances of each case, has the
right to determine whether a correct administration of justice justifies rejecting an application on its
merits, without deciding first the issue of inadmissibility raised by the respondent.48

The court’s stance on standing has no impact on the final outcome of the dispute: the
Commission regularly prevails. Because of such holdings, however, the message sent by
Luxembourg in point of admissibility is not univocal, and the screening power of ‘direct
concern’ is reduced. As a consequence, Commission decisions to discontinue structural
assistance keep being challenged by sub-state recipients.
The story is clearly not over.49 And the unusual concentration of such cases in the
South of Italy hints at a story that is deeper than technical standing issues or national
administrative arrangements.50 To draw meaning out of the many court orders that
reject these actions for annulment is, in a way, like drawing blood from stones. Like
stones, these documents are hard, indigestible and unyieldingly dry. But these are no
ordinary stones—at least not in the perspective of the remarkable scholars who have
tried for over a century to make sense of ‘the southern question.’51 These stones are the
polished marbles of the Vesuvian Villas, witnesses to the old splendour of Neapolitan
44
45

46
47
48
49

50

51

Op. Advoc. Gen. Kokott, Joined Cases C-445 & C-455/07 P, Ville Vesuviane [2009] ECR I-7993.
Commission Reg 4254/88, Art 6.2, 1988 O.J. (L 374) 15 provides for agreements directly concluded by the
Commission with an ‘intermediary.’ The intermediary is to be selected by the Member State in agreement
with the Commission. The intermediary then selects the individual beneficiaries of the funds. In Case
C-414/08P, Basilicata [2010] ECR I-2559, the Commission claimed that its decision to reduce financial
assistance was addressed to Italy only, that the intermediary was not a beneficiary of the funds, and that
the intermediary, lacking direct concern, had no standing to challenge it.
Op. Advoc. Gen. Trstenjak, Case C-414/08 P, Basilicata [2010] ECR I-2559, at 31.
ibid, at 36; Case C-414/08 P, Basilicata [2010] ECR I-2559, at 51.
Case T-65/04, Nuova Gela [2007] ECR II-68 (original in Italian. Unofficial translation by author).
The latest instances of this saga come from Puglia and Campania. In Case T-388/07, Comune di Napoli v
Comm’n (Judgement of 6 May 2010, 2010 O.J. (C161) 39) the City of Naples found no procedural hurdle
in the General Court, and the Commission argued (successfully) only on the merits. In Cases T-84/10R &
T-223/10R, Regione Puglia v Comm’n (Order of 25 June 2010, 2010 O.J. (C234) 38), the Commission did
object to the admissibility of a challenge brought by the Region of Puglia, but the General Court decided
nonetheless to hear the Region’s version of the story. With no more than a nod to the stern ECJ
precedents on point (ibid, at 26) and having claimed for himself a large sphere of freedom in interim
proceedings (ibid, at 13), President Jaeger held that there was ‘no need to adjudicate the question of
admissibility . . . regarding the direct concern of the applicant.’ (ibid, at 26).
See C. Iaione, ‘Local Public Entrepreneurship and Judicial Intervention in a Euro-American and Global
Perspective’, (2008) 7 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 215, 221–224 (explaining the
degree of autonomy enjoyed by Italian regions in light of recent reforms).
A famous example of this literature is A. Gramsci, The Southern Question (1921–1926), Pasquale
Verdicchio Translation (Guernica Editions, 2006).
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culture; or the bricks of a dam on the Gibbesi, fully built yet unable to bring water to
adjacent lands. They are therefore a lens for reflecting—through the bounded but
crucial perspective of EU judicial opinions—on the meaning of cohesion policy for
Europe’s many peripheries, which are rich in history and potential, and yet resiliently
desolate.

IV

Merits and Context

A closer look at the Gibbesi affair highlights the significance of Sicily’s plea, which in
turn exemplifies the background of the several annulment actions discussed in these
pages. By zooming into this particular story, these pages treat Sicily as a synecdoche for
the whole Mezzogiorno, and the Mezzogiorno as one of the many examples of EU
areas that lag behind socially and economically.
In 2005, when the case was decided by the General Court, the sad status of the dam
was well known to regional deputies and yet practically ignored at the national political
level.52 The dam was, and still is, complete but useless: it has never been subject to final
technical vetting, nor has it been equipped with the network of irrigation channels that
would lead to a purposeful release of accumulated water. So, the dam does what it is
meant to do: it collects water when it rains and when the Gibbesi swells. But when the
dam fills up to capacity, technicians are under order to simply release the water into the
more capacious banks of the Salso River, where it can flow peacefully and uselessly into
the sea.53 The waste is insulting to the many farmers of the area, who consider agriculture the primary economic engine of the land, and see that engine stalled due to political
and administrative inertia. Today, this periodic disposal of precious water is covered in
local daily publications, but it fails to concern, other than in times of elections, the
political deputies of the region.54
The reasons for this case of waste and paralysis are multiple and would certainly lend
themselves to investigative journalism. The little that can be glimpsed from the local
press reveals already several complications. One question is whether or not it makes
sense to build agricultural infrastructures in a place whose economic vocation seemed
once tilted towards industrialisation. The dam was originally conceived in 1966 in the
context of an agreement entered by the regional agency for mineral resources (Ente
Minerario Siciliano (EMS)) with a national agency in charge of energy resources (Ente
Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI)) and a large industrial conglomerate (Montedison).55 The
agreement was typical of the industrial policy of the 1960s, when state intervention for
the industrialisation of the nation still seemed the way to go. It was also made at a time
when Sicily, thanks to its natural resources of oil and minerals, seemed set to build its
own power plants and large-scale factories.
52

53

54

55

Allegato B, Seduta n. 605 del 18/3/2005, Pag. 18537, Atti di Controllo, Presidenza del Consiglio dei
Ministri, available at http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/stenografici/sed605/bi00r.htm (last accessed
20 September 2011) (during the meeting, deputy Cusumano asked the president of the Council of Italian
Ministers whether he planned to intervene in the matter).
D. Butera, ‘Futuro della Diga Gibbesi, se ne parlerà lunedì in consiglio’, Il Giornale di Gela, April 15,
2010, available at http://www.ilgiornaledigela.it/component/content/article/9169.html (last accessed 20
September 2011).
D. Butera, ‘Le risorse idriche della Diga Gibbesi da utilizzare per le campagne di Riesi’, Il Giornale di
Gela, April 22, 2010 (reporting that a municipal council convened to discuss the Gibbesi matter was sadly
deserted by regional deputies), available at http://www.ilgiornaledigela.it/politica/9241-risorse-idrichedella-diga-gibbesi-da-utilizzare-per-le-campagne.html (last accessed 20 September 2011).
Allegato B, supra n 52.
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The 1987 funding of the project with both national and European funds still partook
of the impression that the dam (already at the ‘third stage’ of construction) would serve
industrial goals in the region. The construction of the dam was completed in 1992.
However, a report sent in 2000 by the Italian authorities to the Commission revealed
that the dam was not yet operational.56 By the time of this report, many things had
changed since the inception of Community funding. The industrial growth of the area,
anticipated in the 1960s and sustained through injections of public money through the
1990s, had not materialised.57 The EMS, plagued by debts, had been privatised in
1999,58 and the administration of the orphaned dam had been devolved, for lack of
better alternatives, to a local agricultural agency.59
The reason given by the Commission for revoking funds was the uselessness of the
project. In the absence of the industrial complex in Licata, the dam had lost its
original purpose, and the spirit of the project had been betrayed. The Commission
was entirely deaf to the claim that the dam could still improve the conditions of local
farming. This stance was not only due to the fact that structural funds are usually
intended for non-agricultural purposes.60 More generally, the Commission is losing
patience with the claimed inefficiency of Sicilian farming. EU funds dispensed under
the heading of agricultural policy happen to sustain productions that would be
quickly extinct if left to market forces.61 It is well known, for instance, that many
Sicilian oranges are left to rot on trees because picking them would cost more than
their sale value, and that land owners prefer to collect their EU subsidies (Euro
800-1200 per hectare) without losing any money to labour.62 As a consequence, the
idea that much agricultural support is wasted on Sicily gains political ground, and the
EU grows increasingly averse to sustaining the traditional agriculture of the island,
with the exception of a few highly distinct productions.63 The revocation of funds in
the Gibbesi affair seems therefore in line with Brussels’ overall plan for the island—a
land where archaeological sites, natural beauty and specialty products, rather than
run-of-the-mill agriculture, are the real sources of comparative advantage. Of course,
56
57

58

59

60

61

62
63

Case T-60/03, Regione Siciliana [2005] ECR II-4139, at 5.
Allegato B, supra n 49, reports that the manufacturing plant near Licata, to which the dam was supposed
to bring water, no longer exists.
Regional Law 5 of January 20, 1999, Soppressione e liquidazione degli enti economici regionali AZASI,
EMS, ESPI (Gazz. Uff. Reg. sic., Jan. 23, 1999, n. 4).
Consorzio di Bonifica Gela 5, a subdivision of the regional agency for agriculture. This agency is also
about to be suppressed, and the administration of the dam will fall into one of several competing
municipalities. See Butera, Le risorse idriche, supra n 54.
S. Bussoletti and R. Esposti, ‘Regional Convergence, Structural Funds and the Role of Agriculture in
the EU’. A Panel-Data Approach 1, 2008. A special section of the Common Agricultural Policy, the
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), is meant to support specifically farming
infrastructure. Council Reg 1290/2005, Art 2, 2005 O.J. (L 209) 1, 6; Council Reg 1698/2005, Art 4, 2005
O.J. (L 277) 1, 9.
A recent series of interviews was conducted among Sicilian durum wheat growers, with regard to ‘the real
probability of the removal of community aid from 2013 onwards.’ The authors of the study report that
‘more than 50% of the interviewees believed they would not continue to cultivate durum wheat.’ M.
Crescimanno, V. De Stefano and A. Galati, ‘Possible Future Scenarios for Sicilian Cereal Cropping in the
Light of Current Trends in Agricultural Policy of the European Union’, (2008), available at http://
purl.umn.edu/44804 (last accessed 20 September 2011).
R. Giovannini, ‘E le arance marciscono’, La Stampa, January 11, 2010.
Several Sicilian wines are supported by EU legislation that grants protection to their denomination of
origin, and also by funds aimed at advertising those wines outside of Europe. Also protected are such
specialty products as oranges from Ribera, lemons from Siracusa and pistachios from Bronte.
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this view may not do justice to some places’ own understanding of their economy or
to the aesthetics of their landscape; but it is well known that European integration has
often demanded major shifts in the organisation of agricultural production (in some
regions definitely more than in others).64
The context here outlined corroborates the logic of the Commission’s decision, as
well as its judicial affirmation. The Sicilian farmers thought that the dam would have
helped them, but they were mistaken: common agricultural policy (CAP) and structural
funds remain conceptually different from one another and make for very different items
in the budget of the EU.65 Good administration requires that they not be confused by
disorderly local practices.
By contrast, the ECJ’s insistence on inadmissibility is not as clearly justified by the
context. The finding of admissibility for the Region of Sicily had enough grounding in
precedents and secondary legislation to warrant the General Court’s decision as a
matter of law. The claim in these pages is that admissibility might also have been better
policy. The final outcome—revocation of funds—would not have changed, but other—
perhaps more fruitful—dynamics could have been triggered.

V

Standing and Context

‘No direct concern’—the clear response given by the ECJ to Sicily’s pleadings—meant
a number of unpleasant things. First, Sicily is not in charge of its own awakening.
Whether or not it feels the heat of the cancellation will depend on its ability to extract
additional money from the national budget, not on its ability to demonstrate a purposeful use of the funds. Second, Sicily’s version of the story, which by now finds no
listeners in Rome, is of no interest in Luxembourg either. The stale and sterile interaction between the centre and the periphery of Italy, based on mutual mistrust, would
not be revisited. Third, the money it receives from Brussels for a specifically Sicilian
project really belongs to the national government, who will not fight to keep it. While
enjoying a special status as a region with larger administrative autonomy than most,
Sicily remains utterly dependent upon central action. All in all, structural funds may
not be the kind of exogenous discontinuity that development economists deem essential
to the South’s revival.66 There is no break with the past: the money that comes to the
island is really only another instalment of national funding, whose waste Sicily will be
blamed for without being given its day in a supranational court.
A pivotal element of the denial of standing to sub-state entities, in the reasoning of
the ECJ, is the State’s more than purely theoretical ability to bail the applicant out of
its predicament. This argument presupposes a healthy relationship between the State
64

65

66

The EU has, since its inception, identified areas where the cultural and aesthetic significance of a vital
agriculture must be preserved at all costs, even if it defies economic logic and requires huge subsidies.
According to some commentators, the reform of the CAP in 2003–2005 paid lip service to the Lisbon
strategy, focused on job creation and at closing the disparity gap between regions, but it remained a
self-contained policy at all practical levels. See R. Esposti, ‘Reforming the CAP: An Agenda for Regional
Growth?’ (2008), available at http://purl.umn.edu/44868 (last accessed 20 September 2011).
New evidence of an intent to coordinate the CAP with cohesion is to be found in more recent Commission
documents. See European Commission, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development,
‘Why Do We Need a Common Agricultural Policy?’ (December 2009).
cf. F. Barca, ‘New Trends and the Policy Shift in the Italian Mezzogiorno’, (2001) 130 Daedalus 93
(identifying in the 2000–2006 cycle of structural funds the possibility of a ‘turnaround’ in the economic
policies of the South).
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and its local government agencies—a relationship of dialogue and mutual trust. It also
presupposes healthy finances and room for manoeuvre in the national budget. In the
context of Southern Italy, such presumptions are often wrong.67 In deciding whether to
rescue the local entity from yet another incident of lost funding, the State is notoriously
conditioned by financial constraints. Moreover, the central government operates in the
entrenched assumption that the problems of the South are ‘intractable’ and that its
decline is ‘irreversible.’68 ‘No standing’ is therefore the kind of answer that flattens a
hoped-for triangulation: the Commission’s decision to cancel funding is now sheltered
from judicial scrutiny so that the State and its backward regions are left to their old and
fruitless bilateral communication.
The reasons why local actors demand standing in their own right when structural
funds are crunched are, of course, various and not equally meritorious.69 It may not be
the case that the local entity knows any more or any better than the national administration, and the State may be perfectly willing and able to discuss any problems
occurred in the implementation of structural projects.70 In general, a challenge initiated
by the region may simply be a cheap signal of engagement sent by local politicians to
prospective voters, with no added value vis-à-vis an equally plausible action brought by
the relevant Member State.
It is possible, however, that sub-state actors aspire to independent standing for
reasons that are either very substantive or highly symbolic from the viewpoint of
cohesion. At a given point in recent history, the relation between Italy and its Mezzogiorno was characterised by the sense that Brussels’ cohesion policy would be the lift
the South had been waiting for. In light of that history, the regions’ plea for standing
becomes an important voice in contemporary European discourse and must be listened
to. The following sections are meant to place that voice in context, historically and
politically.

VI

Europe and the Southern Question

The destructive force of World War II (WWII) had pummelled the South of Italy more
viciously than the north, thereby deepening an economic dualism as old as the political
67

68

69

70

In Cases T-84/10 R & T-223/10 R, supra n 49, the region requested that the Commission decision to
revoke funds be preliminarily suspended so as to prevent irreparable harm. It argued that it needed the
money very badly to continue to perform its basic public functions. The Court reminded the region that
money is only money, and that the lack of it is never per se cause of the sort of irreparable harm that court
injunctions are meant to prevent (ibid, at 23). Impeccable at law, the court’s reply was properly indifferent
to the region’s real problem. Structural funds should not, in theory, replace the state in its provision of
basic services. But the funding cycle of 2000–2006 coincided with a major financial crisis for the state
of Italy, and the traditional funding of the south suffered a severe crunch. Many lament the contraction
of ordinary expenditures for the south, made possible by the diversion of extraordinary funds.
cf. P. Schneider and J. Schneider, Reversible Destiny (University of California Press, 2003) (addressing
directly this perspective and challenging the assumption that the Mezzogiorno is forever doomed to be
ridden by criminality).
A dispute concerning the contraction of structural funding for Puglia, was articulated in two identical
suits brought separately by the region (Cases T-223/10 and T-84/10) supra n 49 and by the state (Case
T-239/10, 2010 O.J. (C195) 31). Puglia’s independent filing may have been meant to pave the ground for
requesting a suspension order, with local actors hoping that a claim of irreparable harm would have
sounded more credible if voiced directly by the region.
In Cases T-223/10 R and T-84/10 R supra n 49 for instance, the challenged Commission decision reveals
deep involvement of the national bureaucracy with the case.
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unification of the peninsula in 1861.71 The lagging conditions of the South worried both
national and international policy-makers, who saw the Mezzogiorno as potentially
fertile ground for communist propaganda.72 The history of Southern Italy since the
aftermath of WWII is therefore characterised by money injections from a variety of
sources—national, European and international—and development strategies of all
political colours—from liberalist to statist.
Opinions differ as to whether the South was a net (and inapt) recipient of subsidies,73
or rather a victim of camouflaged exploitation.74 The first thesis emphasises the South’s
inability to spend, the criminal diversion of funds from proper usage, the political vice
of sterile demagogy, and the Southern ethos of unaccountability.75 The exploitation
thesis, by contrast, points at migration patterns depriving the South of its human
capital, at the fact that infrastructural investment was small in comparison with the
boost received by northern enterprises,76 and more generally at the anti-Southern bias
of liberalisation.77
The sociological understanding of the Southern question also ranges between two
extremes. One view takes it at face value and accepts in full its premise: the South of
Italy is different from the rest of the nation and from the whole of Europe. Because of
its history, its geography or both, the South is an area with special features. Its
differences from the rest of the continent are not just quantitative (more poverty, more
crime); its problems are qualitatively different and therefore refractory to all known
strategies of intervention. This approach inspired multiple macroeconomic strategies
specifically aimed at reconstructing the South in the aftermath of WWII. Paradoxically,
the same essentialist view of the South is at the core of currently powerful northern
politics, which consider the Mezzogiorno unredeemable and demand its administrative
and fiscal separation from the North of the peninsula.78
An alternative way to look at the Southern question is through the lens of cultural
studies.79 From this standpoint, the Southern question is no more than a cultural
phenomenon created by the intellectual elite of post-unification Italy. The depiction
of the South as populated by unredeemable creatures, brutalised by poverty and
71
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74

75

76
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78
79

‘World War II [ . . . ] destroyed 28% of the south’s already lagging industrial capacity (v. 18% in the
north)’: ‘Hope in the Mezzogiorno’, Time, June 13, 1955.
C. Spagnolo, ‘Appunti per una storia regionale dell’integrazione Europea nel Mezzogiorno’, in
C. Spagnolo and R. De Leo (eds), Verso una Storia Regionale dell’Integrazione Europea, (2010) at 7, 19. The
Protocol concerning Italy, attached to the 1957 Treaty of Rome, refers to ‘dangerous tensions’ that might
arise from high unemployment in certain regions of Italy, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/it/treaties/
dat/11957E/tif/TRAITES_1957_CEE_1_XM_0922_x1616x.pdf (last accessed 20 September 2011).
Help for the reconstruction of the south came to Italy directly from the Marshall plan (see P. Paolo
D’Attorre, ‘Italian Reconstruction and “Depressed Areas”: The Marshall Plan in the “Mezzogiorno” ’,
(1987), available at http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/CES_11.pdf (last accessed 20
September 2011)) and also from the World Bank (‘Hope in the Mezzogiorno’, Time, June 13, 1955).
Spagnolo, supra n 72, at 20 (discussing spending difficulties).
L. Ricolfi, ‘Il sacco del nord. Saggio sulla giustizia territoriale’, (2009) (providing evidence for the
exploitation thesis).
S. Cassese, ‘Federalismo e mezzogiorno’, (2005) 19 Rivista Economica del Mezzogiorno 5 (positing the
existence of a particular ethos of southern administration, characterised by an emphasis on job stability
and unaccountability).
N. Novacco, ‘A proposito di 60 anni di (inadeguata) industrializzazione della Sicilia’, (2005) 19 Rivista
Economica del Mezzogiorno 925.
Ricolfi, supra n 74.
‘Centrifugal forces’, The Economist, May 13th, 2010.
Moe, supra n 7.
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abjection, is in this perspective a fictional construction that has, by itself, generated the
myth of Southern essentialism.80 But because this framing has determined, for a century
and a half, the shape of local and national politics, the branding of the South as special,
and especially bad, has become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The Community’s approach to the South of Italy began simply as a projection of
national politics, with no attempt to bring any original contribution to its understanding.81 The Southern question had occupied national politicians, for better or worse,
since Italy’s unification in 1861, and it was clear to political elites in the 1950s that the
liberalisation envisaged by the early Community treaties might outlaw some of the
special regimes, such as state aids, that were part of Rome’s strategy for the Mezzogiorno. Another piece of that strategy consisted of buying Southern votes by granting
public funds without adequate spending plans, and without holding recipients accountable for results.
This sort of indiscriminate funding (aptly named ‘a pioggia’ or ‘a fondo perduto’)
would not stop with European integration. Italy’s entry into the common market came
with a number of South-friendly provisions: Article 92.3 of the European Economic
Community (EEC) Treaty, which allowed for intra-national transfers to backward
regions;82 the European Social Fund, aimed at boosting employment;83 the European
Investment Bank, presided by Italy in the early years of the Community;84 and a special
Protocol, annexed to the EEC Treaty upon Italian insistence.85 In a Europe of six, the
South of Italy had become the South of the whole Community.86 The Mezzogiorno has
since been the archetypal backward region of the EU and the reason why regional
policy—often referred to as an afterthought—is rather written in the very DNA of
European integration.
There is no univocal account of the socio-economic impact of European integration
upon the Italian South. The inception of the CAP certainly allowed for a shift of
resources towards agricultural regions, and agriculture accounted for a larger share
of Southern economies.87 On the other hand, for many years, the Community’s
80
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Moe, supra n 7, at 297 (noting that ‘the issue of representation is central to the Southern Question.’)
See J. Palayret, ‘I Primi interventi della banca Europea per gli investimenti a favore del Mezzogiorno’,
Spagnolo and De Leo, supra n 72, 27, 40 (‘The most serious limit of Community action consisted of its
almost complete subordination to interventions decided at the national level. In this way, not only did the
Community give up on having its own policy; it was not even able to correct the errors of the Italian
government, whose effects the Community ended up amplifying.’ Original in Italian. Translation by
author). For a comprehensive analysis of the preservation, at Community level, of national administrative
equilibria struck after WWII, see P.L. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the
Nation-State (Oxford University Press, 2010).
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community Art 92.3, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,
(hereinafter EEC Treaty).
Art 123–125 EEC.
Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB) annexed to the EEC Treaty, March 25,
1957. See Spagnolo, supra n 72, at 19. The EIB would fund a number of Infrastructural and industrial
investments in the Italian south.
Protocol on Italy annexed to the EEC Treaty, March 25, 1957.
Spagnolo, supra n 72, at 18–19 (defining the Mezzogiorno as the first laboratory of Community regional
policy, and noting some French interest in the policy because of France’s overseas territories). Italy is
divided ‘between a rich “continental” northern part of the country and a poorer southern part whose
characteristics are largely similar to many regions of the cohesion countries.’ S. Tarditi and G. Zanias,
‘Common Agricultural Policy’, in R. Hall, A. Smith and L. Tsoukalis (eds), Competitiveness and Cohesion
in EU Policies (Oxford University Press, 2001) 179, at 195.
Tarditi and Zanias, supra n 86, at 194.

© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

817

European Law Journal

Volume 17

agricultural policy was centred on price support rather than infrastructural development, and therefore by design, it brought more help to those rural areas where infrastructures were already in place and productions abundant—namely the centre-north.88
In terms of industrialisation, the interventions of the Community in favour of
Southern economies also had ambivalent effects. On one hand, the European Investment Bank contributed real money to the projects sponsored by the Cassa del Mezzogiorno (a financial institution set up in 1950 with the task of funding the infrastructural
development of the South).89 On the other hand, the bulk of the Community’s industrial policy was geared towards boosting Italy’s northern industrial poles,90 making it
impossible for the South to ever catch up.91 It is a fact that Community-led initiatives,
while prompting some change,92 ultimately failed to close the north–south gap in Italy.
It is against this background that the impact of structural funds upon the Mezzogiorno must be assessed.

VII

The Dawn of Cohesion Policy and the Mezzogiorno

Regulation 17/64, concerning the guidance section of the CAP, provided the archetype of structural funds.93 Projects for infrastructural renewal (public, private or
mixed) would be submitted by the state for Commission approval. The requesting
party (often a public entity) did not have to coincide with the beneficiary (often a
cooperative of private parties). Co-financing of the state was necessary then as it is
today.94 This model did spur some interesting activity in the Mezzogiorno95 but
remained narrow in scope, marginal in quantity, and far from implementing any
coherent policy of cohesion.96
88
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Price support transfers income from allegedly richer non-agricultural sectors to allegedly poorer agricultural sectors. It is, in this sense, distributively progressive. At a closer look, however, the transfer is
regressive in three ways. First, it is a regressive tax on consumers because lower income households
consume a larger share of their budget on food. Second, it transfers income to farmers in proportion to
their production capacity, benefiting producers with large production capacity. Third, it helps landowners
more than hired workers. See Tarditi and Zanias, supra n 86, at 205. Only in 1992 was the CAP reformed
to address some of its most flagrantly regressive distribution effects.
F. Pirro, ‘L’industrializzazione in Puglia e nel Mezzogiorno: dall’avvio dei poli di sviluppo al progetto
CEE per l’area Bari-Taranto (1957–1965)’, in Spagnolo and De Leo, supra n 72, at 65 (highlighting the
Commission’s commitment to the industrial development of the Mezzogiorno in the early 1960s.) See also
Novacco, supra n 76 (positing that the period that goes from the creation of the Cassa del Mezzogiorno
(1950) to the mid ‘70s is characterised by targeted intervention, capable to stop at least the worsening of
the north–south gap. Novacco traces the lessening of the Cassa’s efficacy to the aftermath of the oil shock,
which led to an industrial policy focused on keeping up the global competitiveness of the already
advanced northern-Italian industry.).
This pattern was already evident in the allocation of Marshall Plan money. By 1951, the significant loan
of 30 million dollars to southern industry paled in comparison with the 121 million dollar loan made to
Northern industries. D’Attorre, supra n 72, at n 36 and corresponding text.
Novacco, supra n 76.
In 1966, the Commission published with pride a report on a centre for industrial development built in
Southern Italy, thanks to Community expertise and support. See L. Grazi, ‘L’Italia e le origini della
politica regionale comunitaria: il polo di sviluppo Bari-Taranto-Brindisi’ (1957–1966), (2006) 21 Annali
della Fondazione Ugo La Malfa 85.
See J. McMahon, European Trade Policy in Agricultural Products (Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), at 20.
The requisite of additionality was prescribed by Council Reg 4253/88, Art 9.1, 1988 O.J. (L 374) 1.
R. De Leo, ‘Politiche agricole per il mezzogiorno e integrazione europea: Il caso dell’Ente di Sviluppo in
Puglia, Lucania e Molise’ (1957–1977), Spagnolo and De Leo, supra n 72, at 49.
De Leo, supra n 95, at 57–58 (explaining that funding through this regulation benefited the center-north
more than the south of Italy). See also Palayret, supra n 81, at 39.
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The idea of expanding this model of intervention beyond agriculture, and to transform it into a coordinated policy in favour of backward regions, was championed by
the Commission already in the 1960s.97 In the EEC Council, the Italian government was
then the only proponent of a common fund for regional development.98 France and
Germany, by contrast, objected, respectively, to the expansion of Community policies
and to devolving Community resources to this cause.99 After the accession of the UK
and Ireland (both countries with severely backward regions), the Commission’s project
took momentum, and the first European Regional Development Fund was established
in 1975.100 Subsequent reforms allowed the fund to grow in assets and to be further
released from the grip of intergovernmental control.101
At each round of enlargement, new depressed regions entered the Community, and
the Mezzogiorno became less special in the eyes of the Commission. Following the
accession of Greece and in light of the imminent Iberian accession, Jacques Delors put
forth the proposition that ‘more Community financial assistance should be channelled
to the South of Europe.’102 Delors identified the ‘southern flank’ of the Community as
an area of ‘regions that sometimes have no means to pick up on their own,’103 but his
view of what counted as South was remarkably encompassing and allowed also many
French and northern Italian regions to benefit from the newly instituted ‘Integrated
Mediterranean Programs.’104
By the time the Single European Act finally gave regional policy full dignity with
primary legislation,105 in principle, the Mezzogiorno stood to benefit from three different types of structural funds.106 All the eight Southern Italian regions were covered by
‘Objective 1’ of the first round of structural fund programmes (1989–1993), with the
express goal of accelerating the socio-economic cohesion of the South with the rest of
Italy.107 In practice, however, the political enthusiasm for curing Italy’s economic
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See Commission, Direction Générale des Affaires économiques et financières, Lignes générales d’une
politique régionale de la Communauté, Communication de Monsieur Marjolin, Bruxelles, November 11,
1960, II/COM (60) 167.
L. Grazi, ‘Origini e sfide della politica regionale comunitaria: dagli studi preliminary all’Atto unico
europeo’ (1957–1986), (2009) 30 Memoria e Ricerca 47, 51.
ibid, at 54.
Council Reg 724/75, 1975 O.J. (L 73) 1 (replaced by Council Reg 1787/84, 1984 O.J. (L 169) 1). The
ERDF was at least in part motivated by the need to compensate the UK for its net CAP contributions.
See Balme and Chabanet, supra n 13, at 146.
See Council Reg 2052/88, 1988 O.J. (L 185) 9 on the tasks of the Structural Funds and their effectiveness
and on coordination of their activities between themselves and with the operations of the European
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2-1985 9, at 14, available at http://aei.pitt.edu/2831/01/013.pdf (last accessed 20 September 2011).
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dualism was fading. In Rome, the Cassa del Mezzogiorno, once an icon of national
commitment to the socio-economic improvement of the South,108 had come to symbolise inefficiency and demagogy. In Brussels, it had become known that prior chunks of
EU money had fallen onto a pile of unaccounted-for funding.109 Evidence of irregularities and crimes in connection with the spending of European funds in Southern Italy
was being gathered by the Commission.110 The worst, however, was still to come.
The EU had just been born at Maastricht when very disturbing events plagued the
Mezzogiorno. In 1992, two judges were assassinated for having dared to unearth
certain criminal activities of the Sicilian Mafia.111 Their deaths sent a shock through the
spine of the whole country and left the South in a state of profound despair. In a
Europe enlarged to 12 members and busy dismantling the remnants of the iron curtain,
Sicily was as evidently problematic as it had been to the Community’s founding fathers
in Messina in 1955.
In the same year, buried under a mountain of criticism, the Cassa del Mezzogiorno
was shut down. Also in 1992, by legislative fiat, benefits once aimed at the Mezzogiorno
were extended to other backward areas of the country, signalling the end of an epoch.112
In this climate, the experience of the 1989–1993 structural funds proved disastrous.
Spending was delayed until after 1992.113 National co-financing was not available,114
and the regions seemed incapable of spending within given timelines. In 1993, over 500
million Ecus were transferred from regional to central Italian administrations so as not
to lose the allocated funds.115 Eventually, the Commission and the Italian government
negotiated an agreement, allowing the expired structural funds to be used until the end
of 1997.116 Due to this delay, the next cycle of structural funds (1994–1999) received the
attention of Italian administrators only in 1998.
It is hard to believe that anybody in that climate could genuinely see structural funds
as an opportunity for the political renewal of the Mezzogiorno. A leap of faith of such
proportions would indicate that, in terms of strategies for the South, Italy was scraping
the bottom of the barrel. Yet the leap occurred, and faith materialised in concrete steps.

VIII

Structural Funds and Structural Change

In 1998, under the guidance of the Italian Minister of Treasury Carlo Azeglio Ciampi,
the decision was made to use structural funds as an instrument of economic and
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cultural transformation for the South.117 Development policies, until then handled by a
separate Ministry, were subsumed under the umbrella of the Treasury, which undertook a strongly centralised policy-making function.118 A leftist coalition was then in
power and enjoyed unusually stable political support.119 The left had always championed the Southern question and could not afford preaching austerity in the Mezzogiorno, but it could—by borrowing the logic of structural funds—tout a message of
change: emphasis would now be placed on ex-ante vetting and ex-post evaluation of the
projects receiving EU money. The seemingly obvious demand for accountability
coming from Brussels would be, if taken seriously, a veritable break with the past for
Italy’s Southern policy.120
The 2000–2006 structural funds cycle acquired unprecedented importance in
Italian politics and seemed for a while poised to prompt a shift in the architecture of
southern administration. Regions were explicitly asked to take full charge of the new
projects and to rise to the new, extraordinary occasion brought to them directly by
the European Commission. Regions would develop proposals rich in territorial
knowledge, and local actors would fill in the necessary details.121 The emphasis on
local socio-economic specificities would also have the welcome result of disaggregating the South and disassembling the monolith of northern prejudice.122 The very
elaboration of local projects would bring to the fore different realities with both
liabilities and assets, which would no longer be flattened onto a single plateau of
misery.123
A key player was a notable economist, Fabrizio Barca, called by Ciampi to lead the
development policies of the Treasury.124 Barca’s own account of this ‘Nuova Programmazione Regionale’ (NPR) is a story of concrete efforts, aimed at transforming the
culture of the southern bureaucracy involved in the design and implementation of
structural funds in Italy:
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economic policy.’)
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Press, 2002), at 3.
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Models were used to establish benchmarks for policy, evaluation guidelines were produced, and investment in evaluation capacity was undertaken at national and regional levels. These initiatives . . .
improved the knowledge base for decision-making and contributed to a more rigorous and open debate
on policy choices.125

Benchmarks, guidelines and evaluations were rightly touted as real novelties vis-à-vis the
entrenched pattern of unaccounted-for subsidies. In December 1998, hope found its
fulcrum in a convention held in Catania (a major economic and cultural pole in Sicily).126
The convention was youthfully branded ‘100 Ideas for the South’ and was preceded by
the redaction of a hefty document of proposals commissioned, as a platform for
discussion, by the Treasury.127 Excitement and energy abounded in Catania. The group
ended the 3 days of work with a written manifesto, nailing down objectives and raising
the stakes of the reform.128 At several levels of administration, old heads fell, and new,
technically competent personnel were hired.129 The Ministry told regions—as opposed to
municipalities—that the reform was really for them to have and to hold. A strong sense
of civic and political mission characterised the whole enterprise.130
By the end of the cycle (2000–2006), modest progress had been made. Ex-ante
planning had prevented funds from being diverted from their original purpose; the
benchmarks designed at the start had allowed for measurements, and measurements
had quantified Italian successes and failures with a welcome dose of accuracy.131
Overall, however, the culture of structural-fund bureaucracy had not yet been transformed in the process. Most planning had been hopelessly vague; the allegedly meritocratic selection of worthy projects had soon reverted to the old way of funding (again
‘a pioggia’) for all sorts of initiatives.132 Implementation had been sloppy.133 The Commission had found itself mired in verifications and accounting that should have been
performed by local actors. Most importantly, the envisaged participatory forum for
political exchange in matters of cohesion had simply not emerged.134 The political shift
following the 2001 elections had dislodged some of the structures carefully put into
place only 3 years earlier.135 The financial crisis had cast its shadow on the whole of
125
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Europe and affected severely the demand for goods and services in the South
of Italy, with disastrous consequences in terms of economic growth. The spirit—if
not the form—of additionality, a fundamental feature of structural funds, had been
betrayed.136
The momentum of the late 1990s is now gone, and the dam on the Gibbesi is a sad
monument to many instances of disillusion. The hope was that structural funds
would break intra-national gridlock and jumpstart a process of southern renewal.
Cohesion was a promise of rescue, but for places like Licata, it is now at best just
money, and at worst water into the sea. The South can now boast icons of economic
recovery, such as the modernised airports of Bari and Catania, but it remains a land
of severely underutilised social and material capital. The Italian political debate
reveals deep disagreement on how to handle the economic dualism of the country.
Even basic facts (how much was spent for the Mezzogiorno, which proportion of
these expenditures was budgeted as ordinary, what counted as special intervention,
and how much of it was siphoned to other goals) remain opaque.137 According to a
study published by the Bank of Italy in 2009, the problems of the Mezzogiorno stay
in large part unsolved.138
There is, however, a legacy worth treasuring, which may bring later fruits if
adequately sustained. Even highly critical accounts acknowledge that the causes of
failure were mostly exogenous to the design of the regional policy,139 and all agree that
the grid of deadlines imposed by each cycle of structural funds is way too tight for the
current state of Italian administration.140 The long-term effects of the 1998 design may
be yet to be seen.

IX

Southern Renewal and Locus Standi

The novelty of the NPR and its long-term potential should not be underestimated. The
credibility of the actors involved, all endowed with tremendous academic credentials,
technical expertise and proven leadership, was per se an extraordinary break with the
past of regional policy. It challenged not only the Italian way of doling out money for
purely electoral goals, without either planning or accountability. It also took EU
cohesion policy more seriously than Brussels ever did. No longer would structural
funds be reduced, in substance, to side payments offered to Member States to buy their
consent to EU enlargement or unrelated policy decisions.141 The funds would be taken
as opportunities for economic growth and, no less importantly, for enhancing the
quality of human interaction among all levels of administration. The focus on human
capital in the NPR was at the core of the 1998 agenda of the Treasury. It found its
intellectual matrix in the Bank of Italy—professional alma mater of Dr Barca
and headed for many years by Ciampi himself142—whose distinguished affiliates were
136
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studying the correlation between financial vitality and interpersonal trust.143 The NPR
flipped upside down the causal chain of Mezzogiorno strategies:144 rather than considering social capital only a side effect of prosperity, the NPR would begin with fiduciary
relations between private actors and public administrations, create channels of mutually beneficial collaboration, instil trust, and only then place economic growth on this
foundation.
There are signs that some of this vision has taken roots and may survive:
Good results have been obtained in terms of method, especially in matters of planning, evaluation and
monitoring of intervention. The planning system applied to Community funds has contributed to spread
a culture of transparency, which has in turn affected the planning for national expenditures in developing areas and should be further transferred to all national policies of public spending.145

There is even talk of ‘a new attitude of the regions.’146 The icons of development that
have been made possible with EU intervention—new airports, high-speed trains and
school laboratories—surely engendered a sense of pride in those who planned and
completed them. However small and insular, the instances of social capital accumulated around each territorial project deserved acknowledgment. And they got it, albeit
indirectly. A tribute to the intellectual leadership of the NPR came from Brussels when
Danuta Hübner, then commissioner for regional policy, asked Dr Barca to prepare a
report on cohesion policy. By then, Barca was no longer head of development policies
in Italy and would write the report with the whole of the EU in mind.147 His particular
experience, however, informs the whole document. Crucial to the report is the insistence on gathering place-based expertise. Following the theoretical matrix of incomplete contracts, the report assumes the importance of grass-root input and participation
in the design of targeted intervention.148 Wherever resources are underutilised, empowerment and accountability of the base are essential.
Against this rich background, the question whether to grant regions standing in
matters of structural funds takes another meaning altogether.
We are now in the middle of a new cycle of structural funds (2007–2013), probably
the last to embrace so generously the regions of Italy’s South.149 The critique of
indiscriminate funding and the plea for accountability come now from the right.150 This
time, the reprimand of administrative agencies’ inefficiency is harsher and further
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animated by small-government rhetoric.151 In many places, tea-party propaganda has
displaced the idea that structural funds could empower local administrations, change
the culture of bureaucracies, engender real public–private partnerships, and trigger
renewed trust in sub-state agencies.
In this climate, many would probably agree with the merits of the judicial opinions
discussed earlier in these pages. When it comes, however, to deciding whether or not to
grant regions their day in court—their right to give their version of the story and to
claim good faith in the implementation of the funds—a different result might emerge.
If we asked, we might find that a more generous understanding of ‘direct concern’ in
annulment actions is the policy of choice across the political spectrum. For those who
see structural funds as a reason for rejuvenating the role of sub-state actors and for
infusing them with the pride of accountability, the possibility of shedding judicial light
on the region’s failures would be probably seen as essential.152 The revolution envisaged
in 1998 saw Italian regions as pivotal elements of the new administrative construction,
primary gatherers of individual preferences and necessary participants at every stage—
from conception to completion—of each funded project.153 The finding that the region
has no standing runs contrary to that institutional design. Besides, it might be important for all (including northern federalists) to see sub-state actors take the stand and try
to explain their own shortcomings. Policy views might converge in favour of standing.
Policy considerations are, of course, subordinate to textual argument. But when the
General Court and the ECJ disagree about the mandates of EU law in a given case,
policy nestles comfortably in the wedge, and matters. Article 263 TFEU contains
sufficient safeguards against the undue proliferation of actions for annulment brought
by sub-state actors. Within the limits identified by the General Court, standing might
have been affirmed with no major downsides and with some benefits.

X

Standing and Taxonomy

The ECJ’s finding that the state is the proper applicant in structural funds-related
litigation is supported by legal text and firmly based on grounds of judicial economy.
Insisting on a centralised conception of the state also yields the convenient side effect of
keeping out of the Court the debate on fiscal and administrative devolution, which
currently plagues Italian politics and is notoriously echoed by secessionist movements
in other Member States. In general, it is prudent for the Court to avoid questions of
national law concerning the attribution of competences to sub-state entities.154 For all
these reasons, the ECJ may continue on its path, denying standing to regions and/or
other sub-state actors, and allowing only a small fraction of cohesion disputes into its
chambers.
As discussed in these pages, this course of action would be misaligned with the
emphasis on organic territoriality that characterises the contemporary understanding
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Conversazione, supra n 128, at 4.
See A. D’Atena, ‘Subsidiarity and Division of Competences Between European Union, Its Member States
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of cohesion policy, as envisaged in the Barca Report and in the very language of the
Treaty of Lisbon.155 But this is not all. This course of action would also perpetuate the
optical illusion by which welfare matters remain peripheral to the EU enterprise.
Standing requirements, if applied strictly, prevent many dramas of cohesion policy
from being played in Luxembourg, and therefore allow other EU matters to dominate,
as always, the scene.
There is, in EU literature, an evolutionary account according to which the redistributive portion of the integration project came onto the radar screen of the Union’s
institutions only as an afterthought. At the dawn of the third millennium, one reads
that
[T]he EU has travelled a very long way since the time of the original treaties. . . . [Now] there are also
important redistributive instruments at the Union level aiming at the reduction of existing disparities.
The link between the internal market and the EMU on the one hand and redistribution on the other has
become firmly established.156

To be sure, as observed earlier in these pages, the founding fathers of the Community
were much more aware of welfare disparities than they receive credit for. They worried
a great deal about the fact that the common market would bring prosperity only to
some areas and saw it as their joint responsibility to correct such inevitable imbalances.
The form of such corrections, however, remained for a long time intergovernmental. As
a consequence, cohesion policies remained at the margins of Community law for a long
time. Indeed, path-breaking reflections on European economic constitutionalism dealt
with the realisation of market freedom157 and focused on the Ricardian view that trade
between individuals, unencumbered by protectionist regulation, would bring both
peace and prosperity. Socio-economic convergence would result not from deliberate
top-down intervention but rather from the realisation of comparative advantage by
way of private exchange of goods, factors of production and services. The fact that
massive transfers of money and veritable shifts in wealth were occurring, under the
heading of CAP, through the definitely not Ricardian tool of public subsidies,
somehow did not taint that line of reflection.
To this day, there is, within the Union, a fully fledged apparatus of trade law built
upon the realisation of the four freedoms. Within this framework, the ECJ is always
comfortably striking balances between economic and/or social conflicting interests,
even when this involves making dramatic redistributive choices.158
By contrast, the Court is much less confident in its jurisdictional reach when it comes
to development policies, which, inside Europe, take the code name of cohesion. The
Commission defines cohesion policy as openly redistributive.159 This does not mean—
the Commission explains—that income is redistributed from rich to poor as in
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nation-states’ politics.160 Rather, cohesion is meant to bring EU resources in areas
where endogenous growth needs an exogenous jump-start, with the result of enhancing
the welfare of those who live in backwards regions. This targeting of welfare goals,
however indirect, is enough to give the court pause. On its face, the adjudication of
structural funds might resemble the old case law on agricultural policy: in both lines of
cases, the issue is whether Commission funds have reached their intended destination.
But structural funds, contrary to CAP instruments,161 partake of the fuzziness of new
governance, which by definition blurs the line between supranational law and intergovernmental politics.162
The fact that the day-to-day life of structural funds is something the ECJ tends not
to talk about, by holding firmly the reins of standing, has important repercussions
beyond the technical sphere of regional policy. Judicial silence, in a court-centred
discipline, confirms the impression of legal scholars that cohesion policy may be crucial
to political science or macroeconomics but hardly qualifies as law. Cohesion policy, if
taken seriously at all institutional levels, reveals with no shade of doubt that ‘the
division of labour between an EU level taking care of markets . . . and Member States
taking care of welfare is under increasing pressure.’163 But old taxonomies survive
against all odds164 and may ultimately hinder the understanding of what the EU, at law
and in fact, is about.
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